

# Design tricks for great products at FIPS-140-2 Level 2 and 3

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This presentation may be downloaded from:  
<http://www.plusfive.com/reports.html> or  
RSA Conference site over next few months.

## Abstract

Competition in the market for FIPS-140-2 validated products is intense, especially at Levels 2 and 3. Come learn about design tricks that allow your products to have compelling features and be easy to use without adding months to the FIPS-140-2 validation cycle.

Dr. Baldwin has culled these “best practices” from years of helping vendors design FIPS-140 products.


# The “Tricky” FIPS-140-2 Problems



- Physical Security
- Cooling and Safety Compliance
- Tamper Evidence and Response
- Testing Tricks
- Simplifying Device Initialization and Administration
- Integration with Enterprise Authentication





- Must be opaque.
  - Makes it harder to attackers to locate parts.
  - No line-of-sight from outside to active electronics
  - OK to see power supply
- Thwart probing
  - Rule of thumb: Cannot insert a 30 gauge wire
  - Tip: have tight overlapping seams
  - Tip: avoid gaps around connectors and faceplates
- Right angle bends in airflow protect against probing
  - Also helps with line-of-sight





- Flexing the metal (or plastic) box is allowed
- Removing connectors and plugs is allowed
- Removing Fasteners, Screws, Hinges, Clips, Snap-ins is allowed
- Tip: Blind nuts thwart unscrewing attacks



Snap-in connectors can be pried-out to expose components

# Resist the Appeal of Potting



- Potting seems like a good solution (no battery, no holes)
- Post QA repair very hard
- Messy and time consuming
- Some potting can be cracked off with hot or cold bath

However:


- Without potting, need battery.
- Battery backup and zeroize feature is available as an inexpensive chip from Texas Instruments.



# Keep Packaging Simple




- Box with cover, or fully self contained
- Understand threat model
  - No drilling or cutting the casing
  - No evident damage to case







- Stopping fan to insert probe is allowed attack at Level 3
- Include extra airflow space in original design
- Measure temperatures early in mechanical design
- Common baffle configurations:



Extreme Retrofit



U-shaped air flow




Pass through air flow

Baffle assemblies must include right angle bends






- Power safety rules vary widely throughout the world
- External power supplies may help solve Safety and Heat problems
- FCC Part 15 Subsection B (commercial) easier once product has Level 3 physical security
  - Due to shielding provided by metal parts complying with Level 3



# Tamper Evidence



- Level 2: Tamper evidence only.
  - Details of stickers & paints are critical
  - Lab can use solvents and knife-edges to test seals
  - Tamper evidence is inexpensive to replicate once it is approved



# Tamper Evidence Tips



- Overlap seams of box
- Use just one seal if possible
- Inset nuts and spot welding good



# Tamper Evidence and Response




- Locks treated as removable covers
  - Level 3: Must zeroize when opened, then re-initialize after closed
- Level 3: Tamper detection and Zeroization – even if power off
  - Trick: Use single key to encrypt all other keys and passwords, then just need to zeroize that single key
  - Trick: No need to encrypt public keys
  - Trick: One HMAC-SHA-1 integrity check for whole configuration
- Texas Instruments sells \$3 Clock & NVRAM with zeroize pin
  - <http://focus.ti.com/docs/prod/folders/print/bq3287a.html>

# Tamper Evidence and Response



- Level 3 “FIPS game” played more seriously
  - Insert pry-bars that don’t permanently bend the case
  - Drill out screws that can be replaced
  - Custom-bent thin pipe used to spray glue on tamper switches
  - Expanding foam can hold down many switches



# Tamper Evidence and Response



- Must avoid accidental Zeroization
  - Result can be expensive dead device needing factory service.
- Dangers can come from switches
  - Vibration or impact or air pressure
  - Trick: Use only one switch and deeply overlap product covers
- Danger can come from operators
  - Device must support a Zeroize command, so operator error could kill the product



# Tamper Detection versus Logging



- FIPS-140-2 concept of tampering:
  - Device stops providing cryptographic services
  - Device zeroizes ALL unencrypted keys and passwords
  - Result: Dead product returned to factory
- Digital Cinema concept of logging:
  - Device stops providing cryptographic services
  - Must be able to prove tampering happened long after the fact
  - Administrative step is required to re-start cryptographic services
- Trick: Provide service to zeroize the logging key.
  - Generate new logging key. Record date-time and key hash.






- NIST Algorithm Testing
  - Fast path to product visibility
- NIST requires custom tests. Hundreds of pages long.
  - Purchase an Algorithm Test Harness (e.g., from Plus Five)
  - Test Harness implements Monte Carlo and other tests
  - Use for correctness testing.
  - Use source code of harness to clarify meaning of NIST tests
- Corporate officer must certify results are from your real product.
  - Sample details: If CBC mode done by your product, you cannot use the ECB mode of the test harness to emulate CBC mode.

## NIST CMVP





- Product must include instrumentation for FIPS-140 Operational Testing
  - OK to have test build to exercise operational tests that are described in the Derived Test Requirements Document
  - Must be able to confirm that testing features are not in real product
- Tools needed to speed Operational Testing
  - Cause every FIPS-140 error state (DRNG failure, self-test failure)
  - Set and Get all keys (test key mismatch, confirm zeroization)
  - Change Key-Entity association (trick: scripted breakpoints)
- Create Op Test Plan with help from Developers
  - Validation Lab reviews plan for completeness.
  - Over testing can avoid long delays.
  - Perform dry run one week before Validation Lab arrives.



# Simplifying Device Initialization



- Level 3: Strict rules for Key Entry and Output
  - How get first key without hassles of such a device?
  - How avoid need for separate key loading device?
- Trick: Pre-load TLS key-pair and certificate during manufacturing
  - Device protects unencrypted keys and PINs with TLS
  - Enables key management over network
  - Recommend manufacturing modules with unique key-pairs
  - Allow Enterprise to replace these key-pairs and certificates
- Pre-loaded Passwords (if used)
  - Administer via TLS. Good to mark passwords as pre-expired.

# Simplifying Device Administration



- Important services to support for a cluster of devices
  - Enroll new device in existing administrative cluster
  - Move device to a different administrative cluster
- Trick: Text file tables copied to initialize new or moved devices
  - For network distribution, use TLS
  - Each device has unique key-pair and certificates
  - Can use operator-specific passwords over TLS

# Simplifying Device Administration



- For physical distribution must comply with Level 3 Key Entry & Output rules

- USB token

- Smart card


- Custom key loader



- Key splitting algorithms can simplify I/O of keys as multiple parts
- Trick: Load one high-entropy cluster-specific key
- Use cluster-specific key to protect and manage keys, passwords, PINs, roles and configuration options



- Example: Secure VoIP Hardware Product for an Enterprise
  - Unencrypted call starts via desktop software connecting over network to *Secure VoIP Hardware Product* and then on to other instances of the product located worldwide, and finally an unencrypted call is delivered to the destination user.



Hardware Product encrypts external VoIP connections

# Integration with Enterprise Authentication



- Enterprise user authentication is HARD problem.
  - Each enterprise solves it slightly differently.
- Trick: Don't put the enterprise users in the FIPS-140-2 access model.
  - Each instance of the *Product* is authenticated via TLS & certificates.
  - The IT administrators are identified to the *Product* and authenticated via TLS with user certificates.
  - Enterprise user authentication data (Kerberos or NTLM) is treated as encrypted data passed over TLS sessions between instances of the *Product*.
  - Must carefully word the documentation on Key to Entity association.





There are best-practices tricks that can simplify:

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- Tamper Evidence and Response
- Testing Tricks
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