Presentations
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Spyware NG - How Movies will Steal your Identity
February 2006
Next generation spyware will be able to hide inside movies,
audio and video delivered over the Internet.
Come learn how advanced features in video formats enable
this new spyware delivery channel.
A lively dialog examines whether this new threat means
the end of the electronic entertainment or is just another
round in the fight between attackers and defenders.
You decide whether the “sky is falling”.
PDF Slides
Defending the Enterprise from Spyware
February 2005
This is the year that Microsoft redefined Spyware
to mean any malicious software or web behavior that
is not a virus. Come learn how to protect your
enterprise from productivity stealing ad-ware, pop-ups,
browser hijacks, and a host of other pests, which
just might include the theft of your corporate jewels.
In this fast changing market we explain a simple shopping
list and give our opinion on the products that were
the leaders in late 2004.
PDF Slides
Spyware vs. Anti-Spyware
February 2004
In this presentation you will learn
about the sneakiest spyware and the best counter measures.
Commercally available spyware can now record phone
conversations, secretly take pictures through your webcam,
and record conversations near your computer. Spyware
trumps even the best encryption software. Learn how to
get rid of spyware, before it gets you!
PDF Slides
Survey of Spyware and Countermeasures
April 2003
Learn about the products and devices used by hackers
(and employers and spouses) to uncover passwords and otherwise
pry into your affairs. These spyware tools can often
defeat even the best encryption software. Fortunately
there are counter measures, some built for that
purpose, and others such as personal firewalls and system
management tools that can do double duty. You will learn
about the sneakiest spyware and the best counter measures.
PDF slides
Big Brother Slept Here
February 2002
The Big Brother in Orwell’s 1984 had many offspring who are
alive and well in advertising, in schools, in media, and in
government. We will demonstrate how the audience already knows
how to comply with Politically Correct Speech guidelines.
Examples will include successes in rewriting history (e.g.,
how the US won the cold war in the 1990s after loosing it in
the 1950s), and in low-tech surveillance to induce self-censorship
(e.g., the Taliban government). Advertisers have turned out to
be the well-funded adversaries to personal privacy and non-conformist
behavior (e.g., saving money).
PDF slides
The Trouble With Standard Protocols
February 2001
Years of effort have produced robust security protocols like SSL
and S/MIME, yet vendors keep developing custom protocols. The
reason is that the standard protocols make assumptions that contradict
the realities of several markets. We explore how variations on
the standard protocols can meet real-world constraints on bandwidth,
latency, code-size, battery power, and CPU speed. There are also
deeper issues like trust-models and the trade-offs between safety,
privacy, and non-discretionary controls.
PDF slides
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Design Tricks for Great Products at FIPS-140 Level 2 and Level 3
February 2006
Competition in the market for FIPS-140-2 validated products
is intense, especially at Levels 2 and 3. Come learn about
design tricks that allow your products to have compelling
features and be easy to use without adding months to the
FIPS-140-2 validation cycle.
Dr. Baldwin has culled these “best practices” from years
of helping vendors design FIPS-140 products.
PDF slides
Simplifying Complex Security Assessments
April 2003
When vendors try to solve hard security problems like secure content
distribution or multi-enterprise supply chain integration, they create
complex systems that range from tamper resistant hardware, to
cryptographic algorithms and protocols, to operating systems and
up to application development paradigms. Assessing the security
of such products is a daunting task. This talk uses a case study
approach to illustrate general principles for choosing layers,
interfaces, and assumptions to decompose the assessment into simpler
components.
PDF slides
Making Reverse-Engineering Harder
February 2001
The security of many software applications rests on the software’s
ability to hide a secret key, or to prevent tampering with a certificate,
or to ensure that calls to security routines have not been replaced
with do-nothing instructions. Vendors are surprised that it can take
less than a week for a cracked version of their program to be posted
on the Internet. Follow along as we crack a secure download client
and reverse-engineer a registration-key algorithm to produce a
registration-key generator. We end by explaining several techniques
to make your applications harder to crack.
PDF slides
Understanding Hardware Random Number Generators
February 2000
Cryptographic Keys are the cornerstones of modern security,
so it is important to choose them carefully. Often hardware
random number generators are recommended to create keys.
How exactly do these devices work? This talk defines true randomness
more precisely and describes hardware mechanisms for generating
it. We explain the physics behind the generators based on
radioactive decay, thermal resistive noise, and shot-noise from
diode breakdown. We also discuss the engineering issues that
arise when the theory is turned into practical products.
PDF slides
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